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Abstract 
This study assesses the effect of company leverage on corporate risk disclosure in Nigeria. The population of the 
study comprises four sectors quoted in the Nigerian Stock Exchange. These sectors contained 24 companies on 
which stratified sampling technique is used in the selection of 12 companies for the study. The data for the study 
have been drawn from year 2010 annual reports of the sample companies. The study employs regression tools of 
analysis in the course of the study. The result shows that corporate risk disclosure is not significantly related to 
company leverage. It is concluded that company size is not influencing corporate risk disclosure in Nigeria. It is 
recommended that, the CBN and other regulators responsible for term loan should come up with a 
comprehensive guidelines and policies on corporate risk disclosure, because a lot of companies complaint on 
their inability to access loan facilities from the financial institutions and resulted their operation to carry on 
below normal capacity, this is very dangerous and is at detriment of the Nigerian economy. This move can help 
financial institutions to assess company risks and give them loan facility on demand; this is good and can 
facilitate Nigerian economy. 
Keywords: Corporate Risk Disclosure and Leverage Nigeria. 
 
INTRODUCTION 
Annual report can be described as a main disclosure vehicle that conveys corporate information to a wider 
community. Investors, providers of short and medium term loan, government agencies and the general public 
were the main users of the information contained in that report. Beretta and Bozzolan (2004) opine that annual 
report serves as the influential sources of information because of their wide coverage and availability. 
Nevertheless, later empirical studies such as Francis & Schipper (1999), Lev & Zarowin (1994) contend that, 
there is a decline in the relevance of financial statements to investors and other stakeholders. Nevertheless, the 
annual report still offers, through narratives information in addition to financial statements that explains 
accounting figures; sketches and presents perspectives (Beattie et al., 2002). Despite these arguments about the 
relevance of financial statements to stakeholders, but Adamu (2012) concludes that, it is the only medium by 
which corporate activities are communicated to investors and other stakeholders. Therefore, all the necessary 
information needs to be disclosed are passes via annual reports and account. Subsequently, there were several 
events that have had happened in a business and investment environment, hence, have outdated the existing 
disclosure requirements in the world. Consequently, scholars and other stakeholders have been motivated to 
advocate for enhanced current disclosures requirements by incorporating corporate risk disclosures.  
The occurrence of these kinds of events (corporate failure, business and investment risks) in the world has 
attracted almost all the stakeholders globally to demand for the corporate risk disclosure. Several countries had 
responded to this demand. In the advanced world a lot of researches have been conducted in the subject matter. 
For a review (see Deumes, 1999; Solomon et al., 2000; Wood and Reber, 2003; Beattie et al., 2004; Beretta and 
Bozzolan, 2004; Lajili and Zeghal, 2005; linsley and Shrives, 2006; Linsley and Lawrence, 2007; etc) but all of 
the studies are limited to developed and semi developed countries. Nonetheless, some of these studies identified 
that, regulation is the most powerful driver of corporate risk disclosure. In Nigeria, the regulators remain silence, 
but still some companies usually report corporate risk disclosure voluntarily. The question here is that, what is 
determining the extent of that corporate risk disclosure. Even though, the agency theory predicts that corporate 
disclosures are expected to increase with leverage. Hence, this study is aimed to examine the effect of company 
leverage on Corporate Risk Disclosure in Nigeria. The paper is structured as follows; the introduction constitutes 
the first section; relevant literature are reviewed in the second section, methodology used covers the third section 
and result will be presented and discussed in the fourth section of the paper. Conclusion and possible 
recommendation will come up in the last section.    
 
LITERATURE REVIEW 
This section reviews the relevant literatures on corporate risk disclosure. The chapter is divided into various 
sections and subsections.  
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Corporate Risk Disclosure and Leverage 
It is hardly for companies to concentrate hundred percent on their paid up capital without considering other 
sources of financing company operation. Debt is one of the sources of financing corporate activities. The entity 
would be safer if considered less proportion of debt in their capital structure. It has been proposed that capital 
structure of a firm is related to agency cost (Jensen and Meckling, 1976). Agency cost is greater in highly 
leveraged company (i.e., more debt in the capital structures) because a large percentage of debt allows higher 
potential wealth transfers from debt holders to shareholders (Jensen and Meckling, 1976). Thus, agency theory 
predicts that corporate disclosures are expected to increase with leverage. However, the empirical evidence on 
this hypothesis is contradictory. For example, studies of Oliveira et al., (2006); Meek et al. (1995); Raffournier 
(1995); Hossain et al. (1995) find no significant relation with disclosure whilst others as Malone et al., (1993); 
Deumes and Knechel (2008) find a positive relationship between the extent of disclosure and financial leverage. 
Previous studies testing for a relationship between leverage, which is a possible measure of risk, and the number 
of disclosures, have not been decisive (Ahmed and Courtis, 1999; Linsley and Shrives 2006). This study shares 
the same view as above. Therefore, the following hypothesis is developed: 
There is no significant relationship between corporate risk disclosure and company leverage 
Motivation and benefits of Corporate Risk Reporting 
There are a lot of benefits that can be derived from corporate risk reporting as pointed out by Deumes (1999); 
Hutton (2004); Skinner (1994&1997); Turnbull Report (1999); Fuller & Jensen (2002); Abrahamson and Amir 
(1996); Li (2006); Linsley, Shrives and Crumpton (2006);  FSD (2011); Rajab and Schachler (2009); Thornton 
& Welker (2004) and Akerlof (1970). Others include,  Murugesu and Santhapparaj (2010); Nier and Baumann 
(2004); Sensarma and Jayadev (2009); Oliveira et al (2011); Bliss and Flannery (2002); Barron, Kile, & Keefe 
(1999); Schleicher & Walker (1999); Beretta and. Bozzolan (2004); Barry and Brown (1985 & 1986); Lang and 
Lundholm (1996); Lajili and Zeghal (2005); Hill and short (2007); Downes and Heinkel (1982); Healy and 
Palepu (2001) etc. 
For instance, corporate risk disclosure is very important because it can improve corporate transparency; 
consequently the activities of the capital market can be boosted (Deumes, 1999) and increase the shareholders 
value. In addition to the above, if transparency is achieved by way of conveying adequate information to 
stakeholders, the relevance and reliability of accounting information in the part of stakeholder’s decision will be 
enhanced. Corporate Transparency can increase and maintain investors’ confidence; hence accurate stocks 
valuation can be achieved. Transparency can eliminate the disparities between what investors perceive and 
expect from what the corporate management can deliver (Deumes, 1999).  
Providing inadequate disclosure means that managers have superior information to investors, who may not fully 
understand the accompanying risks and rewards of a firm’s business (Hutton, 2004). Additionally, Skinner 
(1994&1997) suggests that, companies might appreciate the benefit associated with corporate risk reporting and 
understand that markets will penalize all companies that provide insufficient information relative to their peers. 
In a further remark, he posited that corporate risk disclosure ensuring corporate competitive advantage in 
attracting capital. However, corporate managers may fear litigation and reputation costs as a result of providing 
voluntary risk information to investors; there is the need for rules/regulation that can protect managers from 
unnecessary litigation due to corporate risk disclosure. 
Nonetheless, Hutton (2004) posits that, provision of adequate corporate risk disclosure will enable investors to 
incorporate such risk especially in course of valuing their investments; thereby reducing excess demand that can 
cause stock price to be critically higher than they would be especially in the event market had the information 
that is available to managers. However, communicating risk related information will improve corporate 
transparency; hence, the problem of information asymmetry can be resolved.  
In views of Akerlof (1970); Murugesu and Santhapparaj (2010) state that if the problem of information 
asymmetry is not fully resolved between management and investors, consequently, capital markets could 
undervalue some good companies and overvalue some bad companies relative to the information made available 
to investors and other stakeholders.  Moreover, accurate disclosure on corporate risks and uncertainties can 
prevent severe damage to the long-term health and reputation of a company that may otherwise result from 
overvalued corporate equities (Fuller & Jensen, 2002; Deumes, 1999). 
In addition, less information asymmetry however, lowers the risk of investors in forecasting future payoffs from 
their investment (Barry and Brown 1985, 1986; Deumes and Knechel, 2008; Abrahamson and Amir, 1996; Li, 
2006). It can also reduce the firm’s cost of capital and increase company value (Healy and Palepu, 2001; Barry 
and Brown, 1985 &1986; Lang and Lundholm, 1996; Hill and short, 2007). There would be a beneficial positive 
impact upon the cost of capital arising from enhancing the confidence of the providers of capital who would be 
reassured through the conveying of such risk information. 
Nevertheless, if company is known to have disclosed corporate risk, there is tendency to come up with strong 
measures in managing the risk (Solomon, 2000). High quality corporate risk disclosures contribute to financial 
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stability by providing investors and other stakeholders with a better understanding of company’s risk exposures 
and risk management practices (FSD, 2011).  It can be evident that various risk management approaches have 
evolved over time and corporate entities have learnt to use sophisticated techniques to quantify and manage risk 
effectively, consequently reducing the gap in internal risk management systems(Rajab and Schachler, 2009).  
The need to report on risks and risk control measures can lead to the improvement of internal information being 
collected on the risks that the company faces. And indeed, the need to assure that the risks identified are being 
managed, as shareholders hold directors to account for their risk management. Murugesu and 
Santhapparaj(2010) argue that, from shareholder’s perspective, the corporate risk disclosure practices of a 
company must be able to relate the effectiveness of its risk management and control systems due to improve 
shareholder value.  
In supplementary, Oliveira et al (2011) note that, proving adequate corporate risk disclosure could enhance 
corporate stability. The role of forward-looking information in voluntary corporate disclosure has been 
associated with more accurate analysts’ earnings forecasts (Barron, Kile, & Keefe, 1999) and with more accurate 
share-price anticipation (Schleicher & Walker, 1999; Beretta and Bozzolan, 2004). This is in line with signaling 
literature, which posits that if no information is released to the market, investors’ uncertainties increases and 
hence the market value of companies decreases (Downes and Heinkel, 1982).  
Shortcoming of Corporate Risk Reporting 
Corporate risk reporting is not completely advantageous as risk disclosures can create negative effects to the 
companies in different ways. There are shortcomings associated with corporate risk reporting as observed by 
several scholars as, Fuller & Jensen (2002); Edwards and Smith (1996); Botosan (1997); Linsley and Shrives 
(2005); Tsakumis et al. (2006); Rajab and Schachler (2009); Hutton (2004)etc. For instance, directors of the 
corporate entities are often reluctant to convey supplementary disclosure in their annual report, because 
competitors may opportune to use strategic information disclosed to their advantage (Edwards and Smith, 1996; 
Linsley and Shrives, 2005; Tsakumis et al., 2006; Rajab and Schachler, 2009); Linsley, Shrives and Crumpton, 
2006; Hill and Short, 2007). This can cause the imposition of a proprietary cost, consequently putting a company 
at a competitive disadvantage and impacted upon the company negatively. Therefore, a company has to trade off 
the positive and negative effects of corporate voluntary disclosure. This can only be relevant whereby the 
disclosure is on voluntary ground not mandated by any authority or regulation. 
Moreover, the truth about corporate risk reporting can cause the stock price to crash seriously especially in the 
short run. Long horizon managers prefer current pain associated with short run price declining because is very 
slightly compared to that arising from colluding in myth telling (Fuller & Jensen, 2002). Additionally, corporate 
risk disclosure is not a costless undertaking (Botosan, 1997) because, identifying and reporting timely and 
accurate corporate risk information consumes valuable management time. Secondly, managers may perceive that 
there is a serious cost imposed on the company from the part of competitors who exploit the information to the 
detriment of the risk-disclosing company. Thirdly, there is the possibility of litigation in connection with a 
corporate risk-disclosure that is why directors are often reluctant to report such kind of risks information as it is 
inherently unreliable and could leave them open to potential claims from investors and other stakeholders who 
have acted upon this information (Linsley, Shrives and Crumpton, 2006). Finally, companies may be afraid to set 
a corporate risk disclosures precedent they cannot stick to (Hutton, 2004;  
Arguments on the Relevance of Corporate Risk Reporting 
There are several arguments on the relevance of corporate risk reporting in the content of annual report. For 
instance, Hodder, Koonce, and McAnally (2001); Deumes (1999) pinpoint some arguments, that narrative risk 
reporting do not compensate for the absent of quantitative risk information because even if corporate entities 
disclosed this risk information, it is not easy, otherwise impossible, for individual investors and other 
stakeholders to transform corporate qualitative risk information to generate their own quantitative risk 
assessments. Fuller and Jensen (2002) argue that trying to mask corporate risk and uncertainty that is inherent in 
all businesses is just like pushing on a balloon today that will pop up somewhere else tomorrow, often with 
catastrophic outcome.  
Deumes and Knechel (2008) argue that transparency among the sampled companies was impaired by 
comparability difficulties, inability to appreciate narratives, failure of narratives to explain more on numerical 
disclosures and absence of adequate disclosure about all mandated risk-relevant matters in annual reports. 
Moreover, numerical risk disclosures are very important, but are not fully transparent. Many lacked reliability 
(for instance, VAR statistics) because no stress tests or back tests can assure those statistics under different 
scenarios. There is lack of comparability across companies, because of different reporting practices, and were 
unlikely to be appreciated fully because of non-alignment with relevant narrative explanations. Users can not 
understand whether the information is either bad news or good news, because no additional information is 
usually given. Where given, it is dispersed throughout the content of company’s annual report (Oliveira et al, 
2011). 
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Oliveira et al (2011) also note that, IAS/IFRS focus only on corporate financial risk disclosure, and ignoring 
other kinds of risks such as strategic and operational risks reporting. This misalignment can render corporate risk 
reporting practices incomparable, and imprecise. But if better risk reporting is regulated, this problem will be 
resolved. 
 
3. METHODOLOGY 
This section considers the methods used in course of this study. It includes the population of the study on which 
sample sizes have been drawn from. The tools for data collection and method of analysis have been discussed. 
Finally, the measure of variable has also been considered in this section. 
3.1 Population and Sample Size 
The population of the study comprises four first tier sectors of the Nigerian Stock Exchange. These include Food 
Product; Household durables; Health and Building material. The sectors contained 24 companies on which 
stratified sampling technique is used in the selection of 12 companies for the study. Moreover, the study is not 
intended to measure any trend, but rather to explore risk disclosure information, as a result of that, only one year 
annual reports have been considered. The period selected for this study is year 2010. The selection of one year 
financial report is in line with Oliveira, et al. (2011); Linsley et al. (2006); and Linsley & Shrives (2006). The 
study used only secondary source data. All the data analyzed have been drawn from sample companies’ annual 
reports. The study focused more specifically on the risk section (if available), Chairman’s statement, MD’s 
statement and directors’ report.  Subsequently, regression technique used to find the extent on which company 
leverage influences the level of Corporate Risk Disclosure. This is consistent with Ismail and Abdul Rahman 
(2011). The Statistical Package for the Social Sciences (SPSS) version 16.00 used in computing of the 
regression. 
3.2 Measurement of Variables 
To test the hypotheses, both variables need to be measured. These are company leverage and corporate risk 
disclosure. As for the company leverage, the measure used in this study is the ratio of team loan to total assets. 
This is consistent with Ismail and Abdulrahman (2011). Nevertheless, in measuring risk disclosures, this study 
had adapted the previous studies (e.g., Linsley and Shrives, 2006; Woods and Reber, 2003 & Rajab Handley-
Schachler, 2009) analysis instrument. A checklist had been used on which risk disclosures were classified 
according to four different quality variables. These variables include risk disclosure categories (Environmental 
risk, Operational risk and Strategic risk) (see appendix A); the nature of evidence (i.e., quantitative and 
qualitative); the type of news (good, bad, neutral) and news time-frame (past, future, non-time). Based on the 
coding scheme, each company’s annual reports for the fiscal years 2010 were examined and risk disclosure texts 
(containing risk relevant information) that helps the reader to be better informed about past and potential threats 
or opportunities arising from external or internal variables. And also the risk management designed by entities 
were detected and analyzed manually. This is consistent with previous studies of Linsley and Shrives (2006) & 
Rajab Handley-Schachler (2009). The texts were measured by the number of sentences and matched to the 
relevant risk disclosure categories.  
  
RESULTS AND DISCUSSION 
This section presents the analysis and interpretation of the data obtained from the annual reports of the 
companies under discussion. Descriptive statistics have been used in analyzing the content analysis result. 
However, the study uses simple regression in the analysis of variables. 
Voluntary Corporate Risk Disclosure results  
Recently, there has been an increase in users’ demands for corporate information. The literature shows that 
companies across the globe were put under pressure to make even greater disclosure of corporate information 
especially those related to risks and uncertainties. In this subsection, the result of voluntary corporate risk 
disclosure by firms in Nigeria is presented. Table 4.1 displays the results of content analysis of annual reports 
and the accounts on the sampled firms. The table shows that all companies in the sample disclosed risk-related 
information. It shows that the average (mean) number of risk disclosure sentences that have been disclosed by 
firms. 
The quantity content in table 4.1 comprises environmental, operational and strategic risk disclosure. For 
instance, environmental risk arises from factors essentially beyond the organization’s control. As for the 
operational risk, it is the probability of losses arising from the essential operation side of the firm. While 
strategic risks arise from operating in a particular industry and are associated with the company’s future business 
plans and strategies. Therefore any disclosure that has been made in respect of the above will be categorized 
accordingly. However, in the form of disclosure as shown in the table 4.1 comprise qualitative and quantitative 
disclosures. Any disclosure that involved monetary will be considered as quantitative, otherwise qualitative. 
Moreover, past, future and non- time information are included under time scales. Finally, good, bad and neutral 
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news were considered in the type of news as depicted in table 4.1. To analyze the date accordingly, the following 
is the summary of overall result of content analysis.  
Table 4.1: The Overall Risk Disclosures 
Disclosure characteristics  Code  N Average disclosure 
Quantity content:  Total risk disclosure 12 96.42 
 Environmental  12 13.75 
 Operational  12 56.08 
 Strategic  12  26.58 
Forms of disclosure: Qualitative  12 85.08 
 Quantitative  12 11.33 
Time-scale:  Past news 12 37.33 
 Non-time 12 38.33 
 Future  12 17.42 
Type of news Good news 12 43.17 
 Bad news 12 9.8 
 Neutral news 12 43.42 
Source: Annual Reports (2010).  
 
Corporate Risk Disclosure and Company leverage 
In this subsection, the results obtained from the regression tool of analysis have been presented. The relationship 
between two variables has been tested; this is company leverage and corporate risk disclosure. 
Table 4.5: Model Summary of the Company Leverage 
Model R R Square Adjusted R Square Std. Error of the Estimate 
1 .284a .081 -.011 41.66622 
Source: Annual Reports (2010).                     
The R value of approximately 28% (table 4.5) indicates an insignificant linear relationship between Corporate 
Risk Disclosure (CRD) and leverage (LVR). This prediction by the regression model implies that any positive or 
negative change that affects the leverage of a company in Nigeria could not necessarily affect the extent of 
corporate risk disclosure, as the case may be. 
The value of R squire (Table 4.5) of approximately 8% indicates that the extent of corporate risk disclosure of 
companies in Nigeria is not predicted by their leverage as relationship of only 8% out of 100% is highly 
insignificant to express the direct relationship. The remaining 92 % is explained by other factors such as 
regulation, industry, dual listing etc. 
Table 4.6: ANOVA of the Company Leverage 
Model Sum of Squares df Mean Square F Sig. 
1Regression 1526.181 1 1526.181 .879 .371a 
Residual 17360.735 10 1736.074   
Total 18886.917 11    
Source: Annual Reports (2010).                     
The estimate of the variability (Table 4.6) for the mean squire given by the regression model is 1526 for LEV 
and the mean of 1736 for other variables other than the independent variable. The ratio of this mean squire F1 is 
0.879 and is too low to reject the formulated null hypothesis. The criterion for rejecting a null hypothesis is the 
situation whereby the F calculated is greater than (>) the F (F value table) at a 0.05 level of significance. The 
calculated F is 0.879 which is lower than F value (table value) of 4.96. This signifies the acceptance of the null 
hypothesis. Thus; there is no significant relationship between Corporate Risk Disclosure and Company 
Leverage. 
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Table 4.7: Coefficient of the Company Leverage 
Model 
Unstandardized Coefficients Standardized Coefficients 
B Std. Error Beta 
1(Constant) 99.875 12.581  
LVR -.743 .792 -.284 
Source: Annual Reports (2010).                
However the observed coefficient of the leverage is -7.43 (Table 4.7) the leverage coefficients of -7.43 do not 
necessitate expectation on the increase/decrease in CRD. The CRD function in respect to leverage in Nigeria can 
be stated as; Y= 99.875 + (-7.43) X 
 
Discussion 
Nevertheless, presently obtaining term loan in Nigeria is one of the worrisome obstacles to companies. Billions 
of Naira loan given to corporate entities by banks have turned to be bad and non performing loan. Consequently, 
financial institutions are now demanding adequate risk disclosure for informed decision. A lot of capital 
providers required companies to fulfill certain level of corporate risk disclosure before given loan facilities to 
corporate entities. This is one of the reasons prior studies relate corporate risk disclosure with leverage. The main 
objective of this study is to assess that relationship (corporate risk disclosure and leverage).  In testing the 
hypothesis on how leverage influences corporate risk disclosure, it is found that, there is no significant 
relationship between corporate risk disclosure and company leverage. This finding supports the findings of Rajab 
and Handley-Schachler, (2009) that state, risk disclosure is not related to size or leverage. 
 
CONCLUSION 
As for the company leverage, the table F value stands to out weight calculated F value, hence, the study 
concludes the acceptance of null hypothesis, there is no significant relationship between company leverage and 
corporate risk disclosures. It is recommended that, the CBN and other regulators responsible for term loan 
should come up with a comprehensive guidelines and policies on corporate risk disclosure, because a lot of 
companies complaint on their inability to access loan facilities from the financial institutions and resulted their 
operation to carry on below normal capacity, this is very dangerous and is at detriment of the Nigerian economy. 
This move can help financial institutions to assess company risks and give them loan facility on demand; this is 
good and can facilitate Nigerian economy. 
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APPENDIX  A 
 RISK DISCLOSURE CATEGORIES CHECKLIST 
Risk category  
1 Environmental Risk: Environmental risk arises from factors essentially 
beyond the organization’s control and comprises disclosure relating to: 
   
• Economic risk (e.g., interest rate, currency risk, price and 
commodity, inflation, taxation, credit risk). 
• Political risk 
 • Social risk  
• Regulation and Legislation 
• Industry sources (e.g., competition, potential entrants, suppliers, 
substitutes, 
strategic partners, customers (e.g., changes in demand, changes in 
clients 
requirements and customers preferences).  
• Climate and catastrophic. 
2 Operational Risk: Operational risk is the probability of losses arising 
from the essential operation side of the firm. Operational risk covers 
such issues as: 
 
 
• Internal control and risk management policies 
• Infrastructure risk  
• Liquidity and cash flow  
• Project failure  
• Product failure  
• Operational disruption  
• Operational problem  
• Employment practices and   workplace safety (H&S). 
• Environment risk (risks arising from the impact of companies’ 
operations on the 
natural environment)  
• Compliance and reputation 
• Legal risk. 
3 Strategic Risk: Strategic risks arise from operating in a particular 
industry and are associated with the company’s future business plans and 
strategies. Strategic risks encompass: 
 
 
• Research and Development 
 • Product market  
• Intellectual property right 
• Acquisitions, alliances, joint ventures  
• Management of growth  
• Derivatives  
• Investment 
 • Technology. 
 
APPENDIX B 
Decision rules for risk disclosures 
1.  To identify risk disclosures a broad definition of risk is to be adopted as explained below. 
2. Sentences are to be coded as risk disclosures if the reader is informed of any opportunity or prospect, or of 
any hazard, danger, harm, threat or exposure, that has already impacted upon the company or may impact 
upon the company in the future or of the management of any such opportunity, prospect, hazard, harm, 
threat or exposure. 
3. The risk definition just stated shall be interpreted such that ‘good’ and ‘bad’ ‘risks’ and ‘uncertainties’ will 
be deemed to be contained within the definition. 
4. Although the definition of risk is broad, disclosures must be specifically stated; they cannot be implied. 
5. The risk disclosures shall be classified according to the grid in Table 1, and by reference to the Appendix A 
risk categories. 
6. Sentences of general policy concerning internal control and risk management systems, corporate 
governance, employee health and safety shall be classified as ‘non-monetary/neutral/non-time specific 
statements of risk management policy. 
7. Sentences of general policy concerning financial risk management shall be classified ‘non-monetary/ 
neutral/non-time specific statements of risk management policy. 
8. Monetary risk disclosures are those risk disclosures that either disclose directly the financial impact of a risk 
or disclose sufficient information to enable the reader to calculate the financial impact of a risk. 
9. If a sentence has more than one possible classification, the information will be classified into the category 
that is most emphasized within the sentence. 
10.  Tables (quantitative and qualitative) that provide risk information should be interpreted as one line equals 
one sentence and classified accordingly. 
11.  Any disclosure that is repeated shall be recorded as a risk disclosure sentence each time it is discussed. 
12.  If a disclosure is too vague in its reference to risk, then it shall not be recorded as a risk disclosure. 
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